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Abstract
Using ATLAS.ti powerfully is a specific skill that has little to do with learning to operate the software. In this keynote  
address I present the core of my propositions that will be fleshed out in more practical terms in my forthcoming 
book, “How to use ATLAS.ti powerfully”. The key issue is how we resolve the contradictions between the iterative 
and emergent nature of qualitative research that is expressed in our analytic strategies, and the pre-determined, lin­
ear nature of computer software that is expressed in the analytic tactics we use to execute the qualitative data ana­
lysis (QDA). Contradictions can be resolved in several ways: through denial, by choosing between the contradictory 
alternatives, or by trading off between them. These variously lead to approaches to QDA that I refer to as one-level, 
two-level, and three-level QDA. However, these approaches to reconciling the contradictions do not easily lead to 
using ATLAS.ti powerfully. By learning from the general principles described in Edward Luttwak’s five-level model of 
military strategy, I propose a five-level QDA that resolves the contradictions by transcending them. I propose that 
this is the best approach to using ATLAS.ti powerfully. 
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Introduction
For the last 15 years I have been observing the roughly 2,500 participants of my workshops, and the  
dozens of researchers I have coached through their projects. How do they choose to use ATLAS.ti? Do 
they choose to use ATLAS.ti powerfully; and if not, why not? By “using ATLAS.ti powerfully” I mean 
something very specific: that the software is used from the start of the data analysis all the way through 
to the end, fulfilling the needs of every phase while remaining true throughout to the iterative and emer­
gent spirit of qualitative research. This is no easy task. I have come to the conclusion that using the pro­
gram powerfully is a distinct skill, over and above the methodological and analytic skills of the qualitative 
researcher, and that it is not intuitive. It has little to do with learning to operate the software. Over the  
years I have developed a set of principles for helping students learn this skill, and I am now working on a 
comprehensive textbook to be called, predictably, “How To Use ATLAS.ti Powerfully”. In this keynote 
address I am honored to share with you the basic core of my propositions.
I would like to thank Susanne Friese for her helpful comments and discussions that greatly improved this 
paper.
Strategies And Tactics
The term “analytic strategy” appears all over the qualitative research literature, embracing everything 
from the most over-arching purposes of a research project to the nitty gritty, practical micro-tasks by 
which data analysis is actually executed, involving colored markers, computer software, or whatever. We 
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can start by recognizing two major divisions in this wide range of activities: what you plan to do, which is 
the general meaning of a strategy, and how you plan to do it, generally thought of as the tactics. Curi­
ously,  the  term “tactics”  is  rarely  mentioned in  our  literature,  except  sometimes as  a  synonym for  
strategy, for example “An alternative search strategy is to select a sample of journals and to search for 
articles…this tactic  was employed…” . I propose that the distinction between analytic strategies and 
analytic tactics is critical when using software for qualitative data analysis (QDA), because the nature of 
our analytic strategies is not only different from, but contradictory to, the nature of the analytic tactics  
when these are executed with computer software. Every aspect of the inner functioning of a computer 
program has been pre-determined by the software developer, but most styles of QDA are the opposite,  
with no pre-determined analytic tasks to be done without regard to the context and outcome of each  
previous task. Computer software is one-directional, always performing the same pre-determined task in 
response to an instruction, and never reconfiguring how a feature will work in the future in the light of 
how well it has just worked out. But most kinds of qualitative analysis are iterative in exactly this way,  
with earlier tasks reassessed and re-characterized in the light of later, initially unrelated tasks. Finally, 
computer software is reliable and predictable, whereas much QDA is the exact opposite: to varying de­
grees a complex, emergent process. In such systems it is not possible to predict the outcome of a set of 
tasks even with full knowledge of the workings of the individual constituent tasks . 
I must immediately emphasize that the contradictions between the inner nature of QDA and the inner  
nature of computer software are in no way a barrier to using ATLAS.ti effectively and powerfully. Soft­
ware to assist us in our QDA cannot and should not become iterative and emergent. But to learn to use  
ATLAS.ti powerfully for iterative and emergent purposes, the contradictions must be recognized and ad­
dressed. Many of the expert users of ATLAS.ti have developed this expertise unconsciously through a 
succession of projects that gradually harnessed the program in more and more powerful ways. Many of 
these experts have become ATLAS.ti teachers or trainers, and pass on their experience in different ways. 
My approach to passing on experience is to help students recognize and consciously address the contra­
dictions I have mentioned. 
When faced with a contradiction, no action is possible until the contradiction has been resolved. But  
there is more than one way to resolve a contradiction, and I propose that it is the way this is done that 
determines whether ATLAS.ti is used powerfully. 
Reconciling Contradictions
One way to deal with a contradictory situation is denial, to not recognize or accept that two things are 
contradictory and to act as if it is not so. Humans have a remarkable ability to do this, as our brains did  
not evolve a mechanism for automatically monitoring and resolving inconsistencies in our thinking, in­
stead allowing contradictory ideas and values to be maintained alongside one another . But failing to ad­
dress the contradiction is not very helpful, and I have observed that this often leads to several alternat­
2
ANALYTIC STRATEGIES AND ANALYTIC TACTICS
ives to using ATLAS.ti powerfully. One is that the researcher learns how to operate the software in a 
mechanical way, senses that the cut and dried software operations bear no resemblance to the ethos of 
qualitative research, and decides not to use the program after all. Or, the software is used only for the 
first stages of a project, and when the researcher intuitively feels that using the software for the more 
iterative and emergent tasks  is  going to pervert  the spirit  of the process,  they move off- ATLAS.ti, 
continuing on paper or in a more generic program like Word or Excel. Or, worst of all, the iterative and  
emergent aspects of the analysis are suppressed in an effort to conduct a data analysis by using the  
software tools in their most obvious and straightforward ways. None of these alternatives is necessary.
Beyond denial, there are three broad ways to resolve a contradiction: choosing between the contradict­
ory alternatives, often referred to as either/or thinking; finding the middle ground or trade-off position 
between the contradictory alternatives in order to partially satisfy the requirements of each; and  tran­
scending the contradiction, often referred to as both/and thinking, in order to find a larger resolution 
that fully includes both contradictory alternatives . I propose that different approaches to teaching QDA 
can be thought of as different ways of resolving the contradiction between our strategies and our tactics, 
even though this may be unconscious.  Choosing between the contradictory alternatives is reflected in 
what I refer to as one-level and two-level QDA. A trade-off between the alternatives is reflected in what 
I refer to as three-level QDA. Transcending the contradiction to embrace both contradictory alternatives 
is reflected in my own approach, five-level QDA, which I will be proposing and illustrating in my forth­
coming textbook. In this brief address I offer only a sketch of these different approaches, to serve as a 
contrast to my own.
One-level, Two-level, And Three-level QDA
One-level and two-level QDA reflect a choice. Aristotle is famous for pointing out that something cannot 
be its opposite. Faced with two contradictory things, you must choose between them. If you cannot con­
duct an iterative and emergent process with a pre-determined sequence of software tools that has a pre­
dictable form of outcome, you will likely choose the iterative and emergent process. Texts that describe  
what I call  one-level QDA treat “analytic strategy” as a unitary activity, with what you plan to do and 
how you plan to do it a single topic, leaving it to the researcher to decide how to execute the strategies. 
As an example, Kathy Charmaz’s widely used grounded theory text is popular because it is highly practic­
al, but leaves it to the reader to choose paper and pencil, or Word or Excel, or QDA software, or any  
other desired tactic to execute the strategies described and illustrated in the text . Two-level QDA goes a 
little further by acknowledging the distinction between strategy and tactics, but matches the two as 
closely as possible, thereby avoiding any contradiction. Miles & Huberman ‘s classic work of this genre 
offers only tactics that are consistent and compatible with the various analytic strategies that they review, 
and focuses on two dimensional graphical displays as the most efficient tactic. Bernard & Ryan  take a  
similar approach, and refer those interested in using QDA computer software to other sources. A differ ­
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ent approach to two-level QDA is to first present a range of analytic strategies, and then seperately de­
scribe only those features of various software programs that could be used specifically for these pur­
poses. Renate Tesch was the first to offer a catalogue of the earliest programs and how their features  
could be specifically used . Guest, MacQueen, & Namey  offer a more recent example of two-level QDA, 
in which one chapter of their text essentially maps the analytic strategies described in earlier chapters to 
the software features in each of the major QDA packages, to facilitate the selection of a package with 
features (tactics) that are compatible with the strategies they have described. This seems appropriate, as 
their method – applied thematic analysis – is at the less iterative and emergent end of the spectrum of 
methods and engenders less of the challenges involved with using QDA software powerfully.
Some writers have bridged the gap between the iterative and emergent ethos of qualitative methods and 
the pre-determined mechanisms of computer software by introducing a middle level of guidance, and 
which I therefore call three-level QDA. This approach implicitly resolves the contradictory alternatives by 
finding a middle ground or trade-off between the two. Trade-offs partially satisfy each pole of a contra­
diction, and avoid the need to choose between them – a good thing – but do not fully satisfy either pole, 
and may lead to something worse than either one alone – a bad thing. Three-level QDA recasts the qual­
itative method into a model of generic analytic processes that can be executed on QDA software in a 
straightforward way. The resulting middle-level model is more structured and systematic than a fully iter­
ative and emergent process, but is not as strictly procedural as the operations of computer software. 
An  early  example  of  three-level  QDA is  the  NCT  model,  or  Noticing-Collecting-Thinking,  explicitly 
offered as a trade-off level of guidance in learning to use early versions of The Ethnograph. The model 
serves two purposes. First it offers some insights into the ideas and practices from which The Ethnograph 
emerged and continues to evolve. Second, it is also a simple introduction for the newcomer of QDA. 
The purpose of this model is to show that there is a simple foundation to the complex and rigorous prac ­
tice of QDA. Once you grasp this foundation you can move in many different directions. 
More recently the NCT model has been developed for use as a general approach to QDA called “Sort  
and Sift: Think and Shift”, for use with the current generations of ATLAS.ti and MAXqda software . 
Another approach to three-level QDA is what Davidson and di Gregorio  refer to as a “meta-perspective 
[on QDA] that is organized around the processes and tasks involved in qualitative analysis” rather than 
the tools of the software programs (p. 633). One example is di Gregorio & Davidson ‘s middle level uni­
versal framework for designing and conducting qualitative research in a software environment that de­
scribes “the core design decisions [common to the wide variety of available approaches for designing  
qualitative research] regardless of the paradigmatic stance or research tradition” (p. 15). Another is Lew­
ins & Silver ‘s model of the basic processes common to all QDA software packages (p. 13). The elements 
of the model are expressed neither in purely methodological terms nor in terms of specific software 
operations, but in a middle ground that is a trade-off between the two. 
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Military Strategy And Tactics
I do not suggest that two-level QDA is an advance over one-level QDA, or that three-level QDA is su­
perior to  two-level QDA. There are surely inherent benefits and shortcomings of each, and there are 
surely research contexts in which each is most helpful. But in my quest to crystallize explicit principles for  
using ATLAS.ti powerfully, I felt the need to reconcile the contradiction between our analytic strategies 
and tactics in a way that requires neither choosing nor trading-off between them. I searched for guid­
ance in other fields that discussed the relationship between their own strategies and tactics, but was 
mightily disappointed. Many texts and articles encouragingly include strategy and tactics in the title , 
then illuminate the strategies but never mention tactics again, or deal first with strategies and then tactics 
but do not relate the two, or simply use the words strategies and tactics as synonyms. (An exception is 
Gorden (1987), who explicitly distinguishes three levels of the interviewing process – strategy, tech­
niques, and tactics – and the relationships among them. This model is very helpful for comprehending 
and teaching the interviewing process, but did not contribute to the development of my five-level QDA.) 
Only one field – military studies – offers a helpful guide, even though most qualitative researchers seem 
to find military strategy a distasteful metaphor for our field, so much of which is in the helping profes ­
sions and geared towards the betterment of mankind, far from thoughts of wars, battles, and weapons. 
Yet this is the one field in which the contradictions between strategies and tactics have been thought 
through in detail, most notably by the military strategist Edward Luttwak . It is regretfully beyond the 
scope of this address to describe Luttwak (2001)’s five-level model of strategy in detail. I shall limit my­
self to telling you about the model, why it is an apposite framework for conceptualizing QDA, and how 
it has allowed me to crystallize my observations and intuitions about how to use ATLAS.ti powerfully. 
Luttwak (2001) describes general principles of strategy that can be applied across widely diverse situ ­
ations of human conflict, thus offering the possibility of application outside the domain of warfare. But is 
this context of conflict an adequate analogy to QDA? I believe it is. QDA can be considered a kind of  
struggle between our unstructured data, that mass of words or images or sounds, and the researcher cre­
ating a structure that will, as it were, fit over or be imposed on the mass of unstructured information, re­
vealing patterns of meaning. It may not ring true to see your data as the enemy; but with poetic license,  
the experience of discovering the patterns of meaning that comprise our findings is an exercise in taming 
our unstructured data, a bumpy path with varying degrees of tortuousness, depending on the degree of 
iteration and emergence inherent in the chosen research method.
What is to be gained from a close comparison of military strategy to the practice of QDA? First, I have  
recognized  parallels  in  Luttwak  (2001)’s  model  to  my  own  observations  and  insights  about  using 
ATLAS.ti powerfully that can now be more easily turned into explicit and explainable courses of analytic 
action. Second, because the insights come from an unfamiliar domain, it is easier to avoid the taken for 
granted assumptions we have in our own domain, particularly in the mental schema we all have from our 
long experience of using software for much more well-defined purposes than QDA. Finally, as an aid to  
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teaching, the rich body of elaborated examples that Luttwak (2001) provides are more concrete than any 
illustrations we can offer from examples of data analysis,  and may provide persuasive arguments to 
students in resisting the pull towards a more step-by-step or pre-determined approach to QDA when 
using computer software.
Five-level QDA
Luttwak (2001) identifies five levels of strategy, and I draw parallels to QDA at each level, leading to my 
proposal for five-level QDA. Each level of military strategy has a different relationship to the territory of 
warfare, and as a consequence a different role and type of activity. I propose that this is analogous to the  
different relationship of context at each of the five levels of QDA (see Table 1). 
The five levels of strategy in warfare range from the most general level of national goals and values to  
the most specific level of individual pieces of hardware. Let us go through them briefly, one by one. The  
most specific level is the  technical level of individual weapons or equipment that are developed and 
tested on firing ranges away from the battlefield by engineers. At this most specific level of strategy, ter­
ritory is notable for its complete absence: strategy concerns only technical excellence of the weapons 
themselves, regardless of where they may be used. In QDA this is the level of individual software tools 
within a program, developed without regard to the context of any particular research study. I should 
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mention that Luttwak (2001) offers many examples and insights about the relations between weapons 
designers and soldiers that impact the practical value of new weapons. These apply well to the relations 
between software developers and qualitative researchers, but I will not pursue this issue further in this  
address.
Let us move to the next level. In actual battle, weapons and equipment are not used alone, but together  
in combinations of different kinds in a particular terrain. Success depends on the next higher tactical level 
of strategy, a more subtle skill that depends more on “reading” the challenges of the terrain than merely 
operating the weapons (Luttwak, 2001, p. 104). In QDA I call this the level of combined and unusual  
uses, by which I mean using combinations of software tools, or using tools in an unusual way not con ­
sidered or intended by the developer, put together by the researcher on a moment by moment basis 
based on the needs of a particular analytic situation. The skill is in harnessing the software tools appropri­
ately for each situation; sometimes using a software tool by itself in a straightforward way that is obvious 
from its design, and sometimes in a more sophisticated way, by using a combination of tools or using a  
tool in an unusual way. 
However, individual tactical units are only a fragment of a larger battle. Critical to the overall success is  
the next level of strategy. This is the third or middle level of strategy that “embraces battles in their dy­
namic totality”. Luttwak (2001) refers to this as the operational level. This consists of adding or sacrifi­
cing various tactical units within the larger battle without directly influencing the activities of any indi ­
vidual tactical unit. This middle level of strategy is Luttwak (2001)’s unique contribution to the field. In 
my mind it is the key to using ATLAS.ti powerfully. Bear with me while I first describe the two most gen­
eral levels of strategy, and then return to discuss the crucial relevance to us of the middle  operational  
level. 
The most general level of  grand strategy consists of the national values that guide the choices made 
throughout the conduct of a war – the territory of warfare itself is not the underlying subject matter of 
the strategy. In QDA this is the level of the research question & methodology that primarily consists of 
setting various boundaries regarding how the context will be investigated. The next level of strategy level 
is the theater level. A theater refers to many battles taking place in a self-contained area of territory “in 
which events outside its boundaries should have no direct effect within it” (p. 138). 
In QDA I refer to this as the level of method & analytic tasks, which are directly generated from the re­
search question & methodology. These comprise the various courses of analytic action that allow the re­
search question to be answered. There is an enormous variety of approaches to generating the method 
and analytic tasks in order to answer a particular research question that reflects a particular methodology. 
This paper assumes that the method and analytic tasks have been generated, as I am primarily concerned 
here with the middle level of strategy that serves as the bridge between the two more general levels of 
strategy and the two more specific levels of tactics. But before returning to that middle level, I will just 
say that  there are  two major  approaches  to  generating the  method and analytic  tasks.  One major 
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approach is to use a generic method that is used in every project to generate analytic tasks based on the  
specifics of the  research question & methodology. A good example is Friese’s adaptation of the NCT 
model of QDA . The other major approach, and the one that I use, is not to have a generic method, but 
to  begin  each  project  by  developing  a  specific  conceptual  framework  based  on  the  nature  of  the 
methodology and the structure of the research question, and that serves as the method of identifying  
analytic tasks for answering the research question. One reason that this is my approach is that I work 
with researchers from all across the methodological spectrum, from the most structured kinds of projects  
to the most interpretive, and a single method or model would not adequately serve all these purposes.
The Middle Level Of Strategy
To summarize, we now have two general levels of strategy – the overall grand strategy of the war, and 
the next theater level, which consists of all the battles taking place in each self-contained territory. We 
also have two more specific levels – the most specific technical level of individual weapons, and the next 
tactical level of small units fighting in specific terrains. As you can see in Table 1, bridging the gap in the 
middle is the all-important operational level of strategy, responsible for the success of whole battles, of 
which many are occurring within a single theater of warfare. 
The operational level consists of “generic methods of war … [which] could be much the same in any 
number of geographical settings” (p. 112; 138). It is a more abstract layer of activity consisting of adding 
or sacrificing tactical units within a battle, thereby adding something that is “more than the sum of the 
tactical parts” (p. 110). In QDA terms, it is a level of data analysis activity that is the same process in any  
study regardless of context. I refer to this middle level of QDA activity as the level of  translation that 
bridges the gap between the method & analytic tasks (what you plan to do) and the software tools and 
the combined & unusual uses of tools (taken together, how you plan to do it). 
This middle level of strategy has no existing counterpart in current descriptions of the QDA process, just 
as it did not exist formally in military strategy until Luttwak (2001) identified it and successfully intro­
duced it to the US Army Field Manual. This middle, operational level of military strategy has always been  
undertaken by successful commanders, but before Luttwak (2001) introduced the concept it had not 
been explicitly recognized as a level of strategy that must be made explicit as an activity, and taught to 
new officers. Similarly, expert users of ATLAS.ti have learned over time to translate between their meth­
od & analytic tasks and the  software tools and the  combined & unusual uses of tools,  but perhaps 
without conscious recognition that this is what they are doing. It is my contention that this  translation 
activity should be made explicit and taught to new users of ATLAS.ti.
The need for  translation is due to the different natures of the different levels. The  method & analytic  
tasks are always expressed in units of analysis, such as individual people, or groups of people such as all  
the teachers in a school, or the school itself, or anything – “newspapers, folk tales, countries, or cities” .  
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The software tools could also be considered for this purpose to reflect “units” that are entirely different – 
in ATLAS.ti, for example, they are the document, quotation, family, coded quotation, and so on. The 
combined & unusual uses of the tools could also be considered for this purpose to reflect “units” that are 
quite different again, absolutely unique to the immediate short-term purpose for which they were con­
structed. The bridging activity at the middle level is translation between the units of a particular analytic 
task to the “units” of the software tools or combined & unusual uses of the tools that will be used.
I make the claim that  translation serves to  transcend the contradiction between the nature of analytic 
strategies and the nature of computer software, creating a larger framework or workspace that allows 
ATLAS.ti to be used powerfully from start to finish of a project without sacrificing the iterative and emer­
gent ethos of qualitative research. This contrasts with the approach of three-level QDA, which bridges 
the gap between analytic strategies and computer software with a generic model of analysis at the 
middle level which is effectively a  trade-off, an analysis model that is more highly-specified than a re­
search method or question, but less highly-specified than an actual software operation. This draws atten­
tion away from what I consider to be the all important translation activity between the method & analyt­
ic tasks that are specific to a project, and the appropriate use of software tools and combined & unusual  
uses of those tools. 
The Range Of Activity At The Middle Level
One characteristic of Luttwak (2001)’s middle operational level is that the value added at this level com­
pletely depends on the “style of war” (p. 113). Luttwak (2001) presents a spectrum of styles from the  
most simple to the most complex. At the simple end of more routine and repetitive strategies (e.g. wars  
of attrition, such as WWI trench warfare) strategies and tactics are most similar. There is little value to be 
added at the operational level, as tactics are simply repeated if they fail. At the most complex end of the 
spectrum (referred to as relational maneuver, such as the WWII Blitzkrieg strategy), strategies and tactics 
are most different, and enormous and critical value is provided at the operational level. The parallel to 
QDA is uncanny, which also has a wide range of “styles”, or methodologies, and which determine how 
much value is provided by the translation activity at the middle level.
There are many schemes for characterizing methodologies, and thus the “style” of the QDA. For ex­
ample,  one  well  known scheme is  Cresswell  ’s  five  traditions,  and  another  is  Wolcott  ’s  distinction 
between methodologies that describe, explain, or interpret. In the past, when helping researchers use 
ATLAS.ti powerfully, I have characterized methodologies in a different way, by their “degree of struc­
turedness”, as this determines the way in which ATLAS.ti will be used. At the more structured end of the  
methodology spectrum, such as content analysis, there is less iteration and emergence, and less need to 
translate, as the units of the method & analytic tasks and the “units” of the software tools and the com­
bined & unusual uses of the tools are relatively, if not wholly, consistent. As methodologies become more 
iterative and emergent at the more unstructured or phenomenological end of the methods spectrum, the 
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units become more discrepant, and the value added by conscious translation is significant, as it allows the 
analysis to be executed in software without compromising the ethos of the research method. I therefore 
characterized whole projects at the level of research question and methodology as existing at a point on 
the spectrum of structuredness, which determined in what way ATLAS.ti would be used powerfully for 
the whole project. This implied that a content analysis at the more structured end of the spectrum, at 
which  the  units  of  strategies  and  tactics  were  more  similar,  required  less  translation,  whereas  an 
interpretive  phenomenology  would  require  much  more.  Yet  a  content  analysis  might  involve  some 
highly-unstructured aspects of its method and analytic tasks that required translation into an operation 
that could be executed in ATLAS.ti: for example, generating an initial, exploratory set of codes from a  
subject matter expert’s impressionistic review of a sample of the data. Similarly, a phenomenology might  
involve  a  highly-structured  method and analytic  task  to  address  a  particular  aspect  of  the research 
question, such as exploring the frequency distribution of initially-coded lived experiences between the 
male and female groups of respondents, to follow up a hunch about gender before going further in the 
search for  meaning.  Taking advantage of Luttwak (2001)’s  model allowed me to see that  from the 
perspective of QDA, the degree of structuredness is not an attribute of a whole methodology and project  
at the most general level of strategy, but is rather a characteristic of each  method & analytic task, of 
which there may be many in each project, each with its own degree of structuredness. This determines 
how much translation is needed at the middle level for each analytic task, just as the amount of activity 
that is of value at the operational level of warfare depends on where the conflict lies on the simple to 
complex  spectrum  of  “styles  of  war”.  Virtually  every  project,  even  in  the  most  interpretive  or 
phenomenological  methodologies,  benefits  from conscious  translation activity  at  the  middle  level  of 
strategy.
Three Aspects Of Translation
I will briefly comment on three aspects of the process of translation. The first I have already mentioned, 
that it must be a conscious activity. One must be clear at which of the five levels one is currently “think ­
ing at”, consciously identify the units at that level, and consciously translate between levels. The second 
is that the activity of translation ranges from selection to construction. Selection refers to translation of 
units by selecting appropriate individual  software tools whose “units” map to the units of the analytic 
task in a simple one-to-one manner. Construction refers to using combinations of tools, or using a tool in 
an unusual way, when the units of an analytic task does not seem to map directly to any one software 
tool or the use of a tool in its straightforward, intended, or obvious way. This translation process cannot 
be reduced to a small set of well-defined, reliable procedures, as many situations involves subtleties that 
make the process somewhat different in each project. The skill of translation develops as more and more 
ATLAS.ti projects are completed, and the reasons become apparent for the more and less successful ef­
forts to use the program powerfully. The best way to communicate and learn this skill may be through an  
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apprenticeship to an experienced qualitative researcher who has used ATLAS.ti successfully on a wide 
range of projects. This is unfortunately not very practical in our modern world. As a substitute, I will be  
offering a wide range of worked examples in my textbook that I  hope will  serve as a guide to the 
process. 
A third aspect of translation is that it is a two-way process. It goes from analytic task to software tools 
and/or the combined & unusual uses of tools, and then when the task is completed, the result is trans­
lated back to the units of the analytic task before determining the next task. However, one principle from 
Luttwak (2001) has given me confidence that I am correct in the corresponding principle of my teaching:  
while it is a two-way process, movement is  initiated from the general levels of strategy to the specific 
levels of tactics. The levels of military strategy are not well-defined, independent spheres of activity, as 
this very brief exposition may have given the impression. In reality the levels are inter-dependent, with  
the activity at each level highly dependent on what is happening at levels more and less general. Critic­
ally, the activity at each level is subordinated to what is happening at the next more general level. For ex­
ample, the design of new weapons (at the most specific technical level) is most effective when it takes 
account of the needs of the tactical units using them in particular terrains (i.e., subordinated to what is  
happening at the more general tactical level). It should never be the other way around, with the tactical 
activity in the field determined by the interests of the engineers in designing technically excellent but im­
practical weapons for a terrain. This subordination to more general levels is the same at every level. Simil­
arly, all decision making when deciding to use ATLAS.ti powerfully must be from the most general to the  
most  specific,  from writing the  research question and selecting the  methodology,  to  generating the 
method and analytic tasks, and finally translation of the analytic tasks into tasks that can be implemented 
in ATLAS.ti. The first sign of using ATLAS.ti superficially is moving from the specific to the general: from 
learning the software tools and then look around for ways to make use of them in the data analysis.
Conclusion
In this brief address I have certainly not done justice to the potential of Luttwak (2001)’s richly illustrated  
model for conducting and for teaching QDA. I have also not been able to fully justify my propositions,  
but merely stated them. But I hope I have given an idea of alternative ways to resolve the contradictions 
between the ethos of qualitative research and the nature of computer  software,  and I hope I  have 
whetted your appetite for an expanded as well as practically oriented treatment in my forthcoming text­
book. 
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